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Performance-Based Compensation in Professional Service Firms 
1. Introduction 
Agency theory provides the underlying model for most empirical studies on 
managerial incentives (e.g., Lambert and Larcker, 1987; Bizjak et al., 1993; Garen, 1994; 
Bushman et al., 1996; Aggarwal and Samwick, 1997; and others).  However, 
considerable debate still exists regarding the extent to which observed compensation 
contracts reflect agency concerns.  Prendergast (1999), for example, argues that empirical 
research supports the notion that agents respond to incentives, but has been considerably 
less successful in finding compelling results regarding the expected tradeoff between risk 
and incentives.   
The purpose of this paper is to extend our understanding of theoretical agency 
considerations in the choice of compensation contracts.  Our study examines the use of 
performance-based compensation in professional service firms, an industry sector that 
has been the subject of considerable analytical agency research.1  In particular, we focus 
on compensation practices for physicians in medical group practices.  This setting has 
several distinctive features that enhance our ability to study a wide variety of agency 
issues.  First, unlike compensation contracts in most large corporations, physician 
compensation contracts tend to be relatively simple combinations of fixed salary and 
annual cash bonus.2  This simplicity enables us to obtain reliable measures of the 
compensation risk imposed on employees.  Second, although medical group practices 
operate in the same service sector (thereby controlling for confounding industry effects 
                                                          
1 See, for example, Lee (1990), Kandel and Lazear (1992), Narayanan (1995), Ferral (1996), Gompers and 
Lerner (1999), and Huddart and Liang (2002), among others. 
 that hinder cross-sectional studies spanning multiple sectors), their compensation 
contracts exhibit considerable variation, ranging from strictly performance-based to 
entirely salary-based.  Third, some practices use the same compensation contract for all 
members, while others vary their contracts by individual physician.  Fourth, the plans 
differ on whether performance-based compensation is based on a physician’s individual 
performance, or on group performance with physicians receiving equal-shares of the 
practice’s profits.  Fifth, medical group practices employ a wide variety of ownership and 
governance structures.  Practices can be owned by the physicians or by outside 
organizations such as health systems, hospitals, or management service organizations, 
can be for-profit or non-profit, and can be managed by professional management 
companies or by the physicians themselves.  Variations in these dimensions, together 
with the lack of confounding industry effects, allow us to conduct powerful tests of 
hypotheses derived from general agency models, as well as from agency-based models 
investigating compensation practices in professional service firms.   
We conduct our analyses using survey data collected by the Medical Group 
Management Association (MGMA).   Our sample covers 16,659 individual physicians in 
778 practices. Consistent with agency theory, we find that the extent to which individual 
physicians in both member- and outside-owned practices are compensated using 
performance-based pay increases with the informativeness of standard clinical 
productivity measures.  However, mutual monitoring by practice members and external 
monitoring by outside owners or managers only serve as substitutes for performance-
based compensation in member-owned firms.  Physicians in member-owned firms also 
                                                                                                                                                                             
2 Only 13.4% of medical group practices in our study provide stock or stock option benefits to any of their 
physicians.  Generally, these benefits are only provided when one of the physicians in the group is 
 tend to receive less performance-based pay when a greater proportion of firm revenues 
are derived from capitation versus fee-for-service arrangements, consistent with efforts to 
reduce goal conflicts between the physician and practice.  In contrast, compensation 
arrangements in outside-owned practices do not vary significantly on this dimension.   
Although agency models generally indicate that incentive contracts should be 
tailored to the characteristics and preferences of individual employees, 56% of the firms 
in our sample use the same compensation contract for all members (i.e., the same mix of 
salary and performance-based bonus, or equal sharing of group profits).  In both member- 
and outside-owned practices, the use of a common salary/bonus mix for all physicians is 
greater in smaller practices with little diversity in practice specialties.  Member-owned 
firms also tend to use a common compensation mix when surgeons represent a greater 
proportion of members and when physicians staff hospitals, but tend to tailor the mix 
when there is greater variation in physician experience and in the amount of time 
physicians spend on non-clinical activities.  However, similar tailoring is not found in 
outside-owned practices.  The use of a common compensation mix for all physicians is 
not associated with contracting environment (i.e., capitation versus fee-for service) or 
monitoring by external owners or managers.  Finally, equal-share arrangements tend to be 
used instead of salaries and/or bonuses in more technical practices where physicians have 
similar specialties and experience levels.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 develops our 
research hypotheses.  Section 3 discusses the sample and measures.  Tests examining the 
relative weights placed on salary and performance-based bonuses are reported in Section 
                                                                                                                                                                             
appointed to manage the practice, and then only to the managing physician.    
 4.  Section 5 investigates the factors influencing the use of equal-share compensation 
arrangements.  A summary and conclusions are provided in Section 6. 
2.  Research Hypotheses 
2.1 Background 
 Physicians in medical group practices examine patients, diagnose ailments, 
perform medical procedures, order and interpret laboratory tests, and provide other 
healthcare services. As with most professional service firms, the practice is either 
collectively owned by the physicians (i.e., “member-owned”) or owned by an external 
party such as a hospital, health system, or insurance company (i.e., “outside-owned”).  In 
member-owned practices, the physician provides labor and, together with the other 
members of the group, acts as owner.  When the practice is owned by an outside entity, 
the physician is an employee of that entity and typically holds no ownership interest.   
 Each employee in a professional service firm is an agent.  The principal (or 
owner) can be an outside entity or the collective group of practice members.  Although 
agency models typically assume complete separation of ownership and labor, Holmstrom 
(1982) demonstrates that in member-owned firms, group members can collectively act as 
a principal as long as the budget-balancing constraint can be relaxed.  Professional 
service firms can, and often do, relax this constraint by running deficits or carrying over 
surpluses in any single year.  As a result, we develop our hypotheses using standard 
agency theory where a risk-averse and effort-averse employee’s actions cannot be 
perfectly monitored by the principal.   In the absence of perfect monitoring, professional 
service firms can induce the second best level of effort by making the agent’s 
 compensation contingent on contractible and observable performance measures that 
contain information regarding the agent’s effort choice.  
   Nearly all performance-based bonus plans in medical group practices are based 
on measures of individual physician effort, such as patient encounters, relative value units 
(RVUs), or adjusted charges (Pontes, 1995; Hurley et al, 1996; Latham Consulting 
Group, 2001).   Since details on the services provided by physicians are captured in 
standardized medical charts, it is relatively straightforward in many cases to generate 
standard, objective measures of physician effort that are related to the principal’s 
objective function (Pontes, 1995; Pauly, 1996).  
In contrast, patient satisfaction, quality of care, and other similar outcome 
measures are rarely used to compute performance-based bonuses in these groups.3  
Pontes (1995) offers several explanations for why performance-based pay is seldom 
based on health outcomes.  These include the difficulty writing contracts that consider all 
possible contingencies that can influence outcomes (e.g., patients’ general health prior to 
their illness, individual differences in response to treatments, compliance with treatment 
recommendations, etc.); the fact that the utility of outcomes is a function of patient 
preferences, about which the physician may have little information; the possibility that 
outcome-based contracts may discourage physicians from accepting patients when the 
outcome is likely to be unfavorable; and the significant incentives to provide high quality 
care in the absence of formal outcome-based incentives (e.g., reputation effects and 
threats of malpractice suits, license withdrawal, and dismissal from a practice).  Given the 
limited use of outcome measures, we develop our hypotheses assuming that performance-
                                                          
3 Of the practices in the MGMA database, only nine percent use quality and 11 percent use patient 
satisfaction measures for compensation-related decisions of any kind. 
 based bonuses in medical group practices are tied to standard clinical productivity 
measures. 
2.2 Research Hypotheses 
Agency theory posits a number of factors that are expected to influence the 
emphasis placed on performance-based compensation.  We examine three factors that 
have been prominently featured in this literature: the level of goal congruence between 
the principal and agent, the informativeness of available performance measures, and the 
ability to monitor agents’ actions.  
2.2.1  Goal Congruence 
Agency theory emphasizes the need to align the incentives of principals with 
those of their agents.  When the goals of the principal and agent are congruent, 
performance-based compensation is not required to ensure that the agent’s actions are 
consistent with the principal’s interests.  However, in many cases the goals of principals 
and agents are not perfectly aligned, increasing the need to use compensation contracts to 
induce agents to operate in the principal’s best interest (Prendergast, 1999). 
One situation where the goals of medical group principals and agents are expected 
to diverge occurs when practices receive substantial revenue in the form of capitation 
payments (Pontes, 1995; Leone, 2002).  Under capitation plans, the practice receives a 
fixed payment to provide care for a patient over the course of the year.  The practice 
generates revenue when the patient designates that practice (or a physician within the 
practice) as his provider, regardless of whether the patient actually receives care.  When a 
physician treats a patient on a capitation plan, the practice generates additional costs (e.g., 
testing, supplies, administration, etc.), but does not generate any additional revenues.  
 Time spent with capitation patients also allows less time for fee-for-service patients.  
Consequently, practices with substantial capitation reimbursement are likely to desire 
fewer encounters and procedures per patient in order to maximize financial performance.4 
Physicians paid on a productivity or fee-for-service basis, on the other hand, have 
incentives to overprovide services to increase their compensation, even when the 
additional services do not provide higher-quality care to the patient (Leone, 2002).  To 
minimize this conflict, Pontes (1995), Kennedy and Buckley (1997), and Leone (2002) 
argue that performance-based pay should receive less emphasis when revenues from 
capitation plans are greater in order to offset physicians’ incentive to overprovide 
services.  Thus, our first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: The extent of performance-based pay is negatively associated with 
the percentage of group revenue received from capitation plans. 
 
2.2.2 Performance Measure Informativeness 
 Agency theory suggests that the intensity of performance-based compensation 
also depends upon the informativeness of available performance measures, as reflected in 
their signal-to-noise ratio (e.g., Holmstrom, 1979; Banker and Datar, 1989; and Lambert 
and Larcker, 1987).  Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991), for example, show that in 
situations where it is difficult to measure critical performance dimensions, aggressively 
rewarding measured performance yields dysfunctional outcomes as agents allocate their 
efforts to maximize compensation.  Moreover, simply adding measures does not ensure 
optimal allocation of effort because it creates incentives for employees to attend 
                                                          
4 We assume that the goal of medical practices, which are predominantly for-profit entities, is to maximize 
practice profits, subject to quality constraints.  We also assume that malpractice suits, reputation concerns, 
and insurer scrutiny of bills effectively limit the extent to which physicians can reduce quality.  Financial 
viability is also important in practices owned by not-for-profit organizations (Prince, 1998), though 
potentially not the most important factor (Newhouse, 1970).  We control for non-profit status in our tests to 
account for potential differences in objective functions.   
 selectively to those dimensions that are easily measured or controlled.  Uninformative or 
noisy measures also increase an agent’s compensation risk by increasing the likelihood 
that an agent’s effort will go unrewarded.  Consequently, reliance on performance-based 
compensation should be negatively related to the extent to which the agent’s job contains 
dimensions or tasks that are difficult to evaluate.   
These results imply that medical group practices will use performance-base 
compensation to a lesser extent when standard clinical productivity measures are less 
informative.  Yet, despite the strong theoretical support for this prediction, Prendergast’s 
(1999) review concludes that empirical studies examining the relation between 
compensation contract design and proxies for performance measure informativeness have 
produced only mixed results.  We therefore test the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: The extent of performance-based pay is positively related to the 
informativess of clinical productivity measurse. 
 
2.2.3 Monitoring Ability 
Compensation contracts are not the only means to motivate agents.  Direct 
monitoring by the principal or fellow employees provides an alternative to imposing risk 
through costly contingent compensation contracts.  When principals can directly observe 
whether agents are taking desired actions, and can reward or punish agents based on these 
observations, incentive compensation is not necessary to drive the agents’ behavior.  For 
example, agency models by Lee (1990), Kandel and Lazear (1992), Chee and Yoo 
(2001), Huddart and Liang (2002), and others examine the relation between 
compensation and monitoring by partners or team members, and show that internal 
monitoring by peers can substitute for performance-based pay in some circumstances.   
  Other studies have examined how monitoring by external principals, such as 
boards of directors or large shareholders, influences compensation plan design.  The 
majority of these studies examine the effects of ownership concentration and structure on 
compensation plans in large, public companies.  Results have been mixed, leading 
Pavlick et al. (1993) and Shleifer and Vishny (1997) to conclude that ownership 
concentration does not vary enough in these companies to significantly impact 
compensation design, or that it has no influence on compensation design.  Mixed results 
have also been found in studies of small and privately-held firms.  Ke et al. (1999) find 
no association between executive compensation and accounting performance in privately 
held insurance companies, which they attribute to stronger monitoring in these firms 
relative to public insurance companies.  In contrast, Cavalluzzo and Sankaraguruswamy 
(2003) find a positive association between pay and accounting performance in small, 
frequently private, firms, with a stronger association when the number of shareholder 
increases.    
 Studies in the health care sector, on the other hand, generally support the tradeoff 
between monitoring and incentive compensation.  Lambert and Larcker (1995) find that 
more active hospital boards of directors appear to monitor and direct hospital 
administrators more closely, rather than using performance-based compensation 
arrangements.  Lee (1990) finds that medical group practices with a greater share of 
capitated health management organization (HMO) patients place less weight on 
productivity-based compensation but have more extensive systems for monitoring 
physicians.  Leone (2002) hypothesizes that it is more costly for national HMOs to 
monitor physicians than for locally-owned HMOs due to the distance between 
 management and physician, leading to greater use of capitation compensation plans and 
less use of fee-for-service incentives in the national organizations.  He finds support this 
hypothesis in for-profit national HMOS, but not in non-profits.  
The discussions of monitoring-compensation tradeoffs in the agency literature 
lead to the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 3: Performance-based pay is inversely related to the ability of 
practice member and/sor other parties  to directly monitor the physician. 
 
2.2.4 Use of Common Compensation Plans 
 Although agency theory typically focuses on the design of compensation plans for 
individual agents, many firms use common compensation plans for entire groups of 
workers.  The common plans can use the same mix of salary and bonus for groups of 
employees, but tie the bonus payout to individual performance measures, or link 
performance-based compensation to group results through team-based incentives or profit 
sharing.   Analytical models provide a number of potential explanations for the use of 
common compensation plans.  If the principal seeks to attract and motivate agents with 
similar backgrounds, skills, and risk preferences, it may be optimal to compensate all 
workers using the same mix of salary and bonus (Gaynor and Gertler, 1995).  
Alternatively, as diversity in tasks and employee characteristics increases, monitoring 
becomes more difficult and performance measure informativeness begins to differ among 
employees, making common compensation plans for all agents less useful.   
The use of common or group-based incentives is also likely to vary with the 
ability of agents to cooperate and monitor each other.  For example, Holmstrom and 
 Milgrom (1990) and Itoh (1993) demonstrate that in cases where it is Pareto-efficient for 
agents to coordinate their efforts and share risks, it is optimal for principals to use simple 
group incentive plans to encourage this activity.  Che and Yoo (2001), in turn, show that 
in situations where cooperation between team members is desired, team-based incentives 
provide members with the motivation and means to exert peer sanctions, which lowers 
the cost of incentives.   Similarly, Kandel and Lazear (1992) demonstrate that equal 
sharing of profits among partners creates incentives for peer pressure and mutual 
monitoring.  Moreover, their model indicates that the resulting peer pressure and 
monitoring are more effective when workers are more homogeneous and perform similar 
tasks, and when profits are shared by a small group.  Thus, our fifth hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4: The use of common compensation plans (i.e., the same mix of 
salary and bonus or the use of equal share arrangements) is negatively associated 
with the degree of intra-firm variation in monitoring ability and performance 
measure informativeness. 
3. Research Design 
3.1 Sample 
 Our data come from a nationwide survey developed and conducted by the 
Medical Group Management Association (MGMA).  Surveys were mailed to 5,193 
MGMA member practices in February of 1999 asking about their 1998 operations.  
Responses were received from 1,772 practices.  The MGMA staff eliminated 114 surveys 
due to incomplete data reporting or duplication and 49 surveys due to late submission, 
yielding an adjusted response rate of 30.98%.   
The mean (median) practice in our sample has 20 (9) members.  We retain 
observations from physician-owned practices with five or more members.  This 
restriction is imposed because a minimum of 2 members is necessary for moral hazard to 
 be present and 3 members to prevent shirking from being directly traceable.5  We also 
retain all observations from practices owned by hospitals, health systems, insurers, 
foundations, and other external organizations because the physician is an employee (or 
agent) of a larger organization.  Our final sample consists of 897 medical group practices 
and 17,332 individual physicians.   
3.2 Variables 
3.2.1 Performance-based compensation 
The extent of performance-based compensation is measured using a survey 
question asking respondents to indicate, for each physician in the practice, the method 
used to determine compensation, from the following list: 100% individual productivity 
(0% salary), 50-99% individual productivity (1-50% salary), 50-99% salary (1-50% 
productivity), 100% salary (0% productivity), or 100% equal share.6  Examples of 
productivity measures given in the survey instructions include gross charges, encounters, 
and relative value units (RVUs).  Consistent with evidence in the practitioner literature 
(Hurley et al, 1996; Latham Consulting Group, 2001), this question assumes that 
individual performance-based compensation is a function of clinical productivity.  The 
amount of compensation not based on productivity or equal shares is defined as “fixed” 
or “guaranteed salary.”   
                                                          
5 Our results change little when the analyses are run with minimum practice sizes of three, ten, and 15 
physicians.  
6 The survey also allowed an “other” response to this question.  Of the 24,541physicians in the MGMA 
data base, only 217 (0.88%) gave this response.  These responses are eliminated from our analyses.  We 
conducted a number of tests to establish the construct validity of our categorical compensation variable.  As 
reported in Appendix A, the statistical relations between compensation and productivity are consistent with 
the categorical responses on pay-performance sensitivities.  In addition, mean total compensation levels for 
each of the survey categories confirmed that the amount of pay is increasing in the amount of risk imposed 
on a physician. 
 In practices using some combination of salary and individual performance-based 
pay, we measure pay-performance intensity for each physician using the midpoint in each 
response category:  0 if compensation is entirely salary-based; 25 if 1-50% of 
compensation is based on performance; 75 if 50%-99% of compensation is based on 
productivity; and 100 if compensation is entirely productivity-based.7    
In tests comparing the use of salary and/or bonus to the use of equal shares, the 
variable Equal Shares is coded one if equal sharing of profits is used to compensate a 
physician, and zero if some combination of salary and bonus is used.   
 
3.2.2 Goal congruence 
We test our first hypothesis using the percentage of group revenues derived from 
capitation plans (denoted Capitation).  We expect less weight on performance-based pay 
when more revenue is received from capitation contracts, thereby reducing goal conflicts 
between the physician and practice.  Capitation levels range from 0% to 100% of 
revenues (mean = 6.8%). 
3.2.3 Informativeness 
We use four variables to proxy for the informativeness of standard clinical 
productivity measures. 
Hospital staffing.  Physicians in some groups are employed by or contract with a 
hospital to staff a department.  Physicians who staff hospital departments often have 
relatively little control over their workflow, which is driven by overall patient volume at 
the hospital.  For example, the number of cases processed by hospital-based physicians 
depends primarily on hospital volume, which is influenced by the hospital’s reputation 
                                                          
7 Since the performance-based compensation variable is based on categorical responses, we repeated 
 and various uncontrollable events (e.g., weather conditions).  Consequently, clinical 
productivity measures may provide little information on the physician’s effort level, and 
may impose too much compensation risk on the physician.  We therefore predict that 
pay-performance intensity is lower for physicians in group practices that staff hospitals.  
The variable Staff equals one if the group staffs a hospital department, and zero 
otherwise.   
Physician experience.  Pauly and Gaynor (1990) find that a physician’s clinical 
efficiency improves with experience.  The initial years after residency may constitute 
additional training for a physician where effort does not directly translate into clinical 
performance.  Young physicians may also expend effort in building a patient base and 
reputation building that is not reflected in clinical-based performance measures.  Thus, 
the health economics literature suggests that the use of performance-based compensation 
should increase with physician experience because clinical performance measures are 
more informative about physician effort.   
This result is similar to economics literature on partnerships (Akerlof and Katz, 
1989; Lazear, 1991; Landers et al, 1996; Gompers and Lerner, 1999).  If the principal and 
agent have the same initial information, less experienced professionals are expected to 
work harder in the absence of explicit performance-based contracts in order to convince 
the principal that they have high potential.  Furthermore, less experienced workers may 
be more willing to supply effort without performance-based compensation because doing 
so increases the likelihood that the worker will survive in the firm long enough to attain 
the high compensation that is earned by experienced employees.   
                                                                                                                                                                             
analyses examining performance-pay intensity using ordinal logit, which yielded materially similar results.    
 An alternative perspective is that the principal does not know the ability of the 
agent and uses performance-based compensation contracts to induce effort and/or to 
attract more capable agents.  Gibbons and Murphy (1992), Milbourn (1998), and others 
develop this theory and find that as the firm gains more experience with the agent, there 
is less uncertainty about the agent’s ability and less need to impose costly risk on the 
agent.  Thus, once the principal learns the agent’s “type,” an appropriate fixed salary is 
paid to the agent and no compensation risk is imposed.  Ignoring incentive issues that 
may arise as the agent approaches retirement, this economic theory suggests that there is 
an inverse relation between the use of performance-based compensation and physician 
experience.   
Although physician experience is an important factor in the contracting 
environment, it has a theoretically ambiguous relation with the use of performance-based 
compensation contracts.  Since the impact of physician experience is unlikely to be a 
linear function of years in the physician’s chosen specialty, we use two indicator 
variables to measures the number of years the physician has practiced in his or her 
specialty: <= 2 years, which equals one if the physician has two or fewer years 
experience in the specialty, and zero otherwise; and 3-5 years, which equals one if the 
physician has three to five experience in the specialty, and zero otherwise.  
Non-Clinical Activity.  Although medical group practices use productivity 
measures almost exclusively when determining performance-based compensation, 
physicians can have many responsibilities in addition to their clinical duties (e.g., resident 
training, research, and administration).   Traditional clinical measures provide little or no 
information regarding non-clinical responsibility, and can induce dysfunctional behavior 
 (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991). Moreover, Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) point out 
that it is extremely difficult to measure tasks such as education and research, and argue 
that in multi-tasking environments where effort is difficult to measure on some 
dimensions, performance-based pay can be counter-productive.  We therefore expect the 
extent of a physician’s non-clinical responsibility to be inversely related to the use of 
performance-based contracts. The variable Non-Clinical equals the percentage of full-
time-equivalent (FTE) units that a physician devotes to non-clinical work.     
3.2.4 Monitoring Ability  
Group Size. One factor that is likely to impact the ability to monitor the physician 
is the size of the group practice.  As the size of the practice increases, it becomes 
increasingly difficult for physicians to mutually monitor each other or for external owners 
or managers to assess agents’ actions (Holmstrom, 1982; Kandel and Lazear, 1992).8  
Our first proxy variable for monitoring is the natural logarithm of the number of full-time 
physicians in the group practice (denoted Size).  We expect larger practices to place more 
weight on performance-based compensation.   
Physician Specialty.  Another factor affecting the ability to monitor practice 
members is the complexity of services performed by the physician.  Highly specialized 
physicians (e.g., neurosurgeons) often treat non-routine ailments that may not have an 
established medical protocol or benchmark performance.  In contrast, there are well-
established standards for the number of patients a primary physician can examine 
(Pontes, 1995).  Thus, the ability to monitor a physician (either by other physicians or 
                                                          
8 Kandel and Lazear (1993) argue that incentives do not always weaken as firm size increases.  For 
example, agent effort might increase with the number of employees because of increased peer pressure also 
increases with size and this mitigates the free rider problem.  However, they also argue that the benefits 
from more monitors are likely to decline as the firm gets extremely large. 
 other parties) declines as a physician provides a more complex service to patients.  Our 
second set of monitoring proxies therefore relates to the physician’s specialty grouping.  
The three groupings include Primary care (family practice, general internal medicine, or 
general pediatrics), Surgical (all surgical specialties plus the specialties of gynecology, 
obstetrics, opthalmology, otorhinolaryngology, or urology), and Non-surgical 
(anesthesiology, emergency medicine, hematology/onocology, nuclear medicine, 
oncology, pathology, radiology, or other specialties not included in the primary care or 
surgical categories).  Each variable is coded one if the physician’s specialty fits into that 
grouping, and zero otherwise.  Based on their level of complexity, we expect surgical 
practices to use more performance-based compensation than non-surgical practices, and 
non-surgical practices to use more performance-based compensation than primary care 
practices.9   
Similarity in Specialties.  Although the type of specialty is critical for monitoring, 
physicians in member-owned practices can have very similar skills and this will increase 
their ability to monitor each other (Kandel and Lazear, 1992).  For example, it may be 
very difficult to monitor a neurosurgeon, but this activity is clearly easier for other 
neurosurgeons than for a primary care physician.  Our fourth proxy for monitoring ability 
is therefore the concentration of specialties in the practice.  The variable Specialty 
diversity represents the number of different specialties in the group scaled by the number 
of group members (with smaller values indicating greater diversity).  We expect greater 
diversity to increase the weight on performance-based compensation.  
Use of Professional Management Companies.  Professional service firms 
sometimes engage the services of an outside management company to help manage the 
                                                          
9 The Primary care grouping is omitted from the analyses to permit model estimation. 
 practice or perform administrative functions, such as invoicing and scheduling.  These 
firms are known as management services organizations (MSO) or physician practice 
management corporations (PPMC).  In many cases, outside management companies 
provide services that allow practices to more closely monitor individual physicians 
(Dynan et al., 1998).  Accordingly, these services should improve monitoring and 
substitute for the use of performance-based compensation contracts.  We measure the use 
of outside management firms using an indicator variable that has a value of one if the 
practice uses an MSO or PPMC and zero otherwise (denoted Management co.).   
Physician executive.  Rather than using an outside management service, member-
owned practices can appoint one of the group members to manage the practice and grant 
him an equity interest.  The executive partner essentially fulfills the role of the principal 
because he does not contribute directly to the group’s productivity, but the value of his 
ownership interest depends upon the productivity of the other physicians in the group.  
However, the monitoring by this executive partner can substitute for the use of a 
performance-based compensation contract. This is consistent with Alchain and Demsetz 
(1972), who argue that inefficiency in partnerships will prompt partnerships to hire a 
principal to monitor agents and grant the monitor an equity interest.  Similarly, Huddart 
and Liang (2002) claim that when monitoring is personally costly to a partner who 
undertakes the monitoring, each individual partner shirks the monitoring task.  Their 
model indicates that it becomes optimal for partnerships to appoint one partner to 
specialize in monitoring.  Accordingly, productivity-based compensation is predicted to 
be lower for those member-owned practices that have an executive partner.  The variable 
 Physician executive equals one if a member-owned practice uses a physician executive 
partner to run the practice and zero otherwise.   
Outside Ownership.  Some practices are owned by outside entities such as 
hospitals, health systems, and foundations, as opposed to being member-owned practices.  
These outside entities are in the business of administering the provision of health care and 
have elaborate control systems that gather information on physician decisions.  The 
monitoring by these outside entities should substitute for the use of a performance-based 
compensation contract (Lee, 1990).  We measure outside monitoring using indicator 
variables that have a value of one if the practice is owned by an MSO or PPMC (denoted 
MSO/PPMC owns) or some other organization such as a foundation (denoted Other 
owner).  Hospital owned practices serve as the base case in the models.   
3.2.5 Controls 
Not-for-profit.  Prior studies find less use of fee-for-service or productivity-based 
pay in non-profit medical groups (Lee, 1990; Leone, 2002).  We include an indicator 
variable for practices owned by non-profit entities (denoted Not for profit) to control for 
this possibility.  
Labor markets.  Compensation methods in medical practices are likely influenced 
by labor market factors, such as the degree of competition, the extent of HMO 
penetration, and the demand for physician services (Hurley et al., 1996; Leone, 2002).  
Two sets of categorical variables are used to control for labor market influences.  The 
first set controls for urban, suburban, and rural settings.  The second set controls for 
region (Northeast, North Atlantic, Mid-Atlantic, Rocky Mountain, Northwest, Southwest, 
 Eastern Midwest, Lower Midwest, Upper Midwest, Southern California, and Northern 
California).  Urban and Upper Midwest indicator variables are excluded from the models. 
3.3 Descriptive Statistics 
 Descriptive statistics are reported in Table 1.  Panels A and B provide information 
on pay practices and professional characteristics for the individual physicians in our 
sample.  Significant differences exist between member- and outside-owned groups.  
Whereas 61% of physicians in member-owned groups receive at least half of their 
compensation in the form of productivity-based bonuses, only 40% of physicians in 
outside-owned groups have more than 50% of compensation tied to bonuses.  Similarly, 
27% of physicians in outside-owned groups have no performance-based pay versus 14% 
in member-owned groups.  Equal shares are used to compensate 6% of physicians in 
member-owned groups, but only seven physicians (0.0002%) in outside-owned groups. 
 Physicians in member-owned groups tend to receive higher total compensation 
(mean = $258,409 vs. $178,983; median = $210,000 vs. $152,209), consistent with the 
greatest use of performance-based pay in these practices.  On average, physicians in 
member-owned practices are less likely to work in primary care specialties (29.9% vs. 
59.8%), have fewer colleagues in the group practicing the same specialty (1.86 
physicians vs. 2.42), have more experience (13.8 years vs. 12.8 years), and spend less 
time on non-clinical activities (4.4% of time vs. 6.6%). 
  Panels C and D examine variations in group-level pay practices and 
characteristics.   In both member- and outside-owned groups, the majority of group 
members are covered by a common compensation plan.  Overall, 51.4% of groups pay all 
 physicians using the same salary/bonus mix, and 71.0% use the same mix for at least 
80% of their physicians.  Equal shares are used in 121 groups (13.5%), only two of which 
are outside-owned.  Nearly 5% of the groups use equal shares for all physicians, and 
7.8% use equal shares for 80% or more of their physicians.   
Member-owned groups tend to have fewer physicians (mean = 9 physicians vs. 
15), less diversity in the number of specialties in the practice (mean = 0.26 vs. 0.29), a 
larger percentage of surgical and non-surgical specialists (mean = 40.7% and 37.1%, 
respectively, vs. 12.1% and 17.4%), less variation in experience (mean = 0.77 vs. 0.84), 
fewer physicians with less than five years experience (mean = 7.7% with two or fewer 
years experience and 12.4% with three to five years vs. 13.3% and 18.8%, respectively), 
and less variation in the amount of time spent on non-clinical activities (mean = 8% vs. 
11%).    
 Outside-owned practices are more likely to staff hospitals (25.9% for outside-
owned vs. 20.1% for member-owned) and receive more reimbursement from capitation 
contracts (mean = 11.8% of revenues vs. 5.6%).  However, the use of management 
companies for providing administrative services is not statistically different in the two 
groups.  Physician executives are used by 12% of the member-owned practices, all of 
which are for-profit entities.  Nearly three-quarters (73.6%) of outside-owned practices 
are owned by hospitals, 3.4% by MSOs or PPMCs, and 23.0% by other owners (e.g., 
universities, insurance companies, etc.), and 67.2% are non-profit. 
3.4 Correlations 
 Table 2 provides correlations among the variables used in our physician-level tests.  
In general, the correlations are quite small, suggesting no problems with 
multicollinearity.  Only three substantive correlations exceed 0.30 in absolute value.  
Groups with more members are more likely to staff hospitals, receive more revenues in 
the form of capitation payments.  Physicians in larger groups also tend to work with more 
physicians in the same specialty.    
4. Factors Influencing the Weights on Salary and Performance-Based Pay 
4.1 Physician-Level Tests 
Our first set of tests examine the use of performance-based incentive plans that 
base compensation on individual (rather than group) performance.  We begin by 
examining pay practices for individual physician.  Since observations from physicians in 
the same group may not be independent, Huber/White robust standard errors are used to 
assess the significance of coefficients (Huber, 1967; White, 1980).  The robust standard 
errors enable us to relax the assumption of independence within practices. Table 3 
contains ordinary least squares regression estimates for member-owned and outside-
owned firms.  The model is highly significant (p < 0.01) for both samples, with adjusted 
r-squareds of 30 percent and 46 percent for the member-owned and outside-owned 
samples, respectively.  Moreover, the results identify both similarities and differences 
between member-owned and outside-owned practices.  
Consistent with Hypothesis 1, our measure of goal incongruence, the size of a 
physician’s capitated patient base, is negatively and significantly (p < 0.01, two-tailed) 
associated with the use of performance-based pay in member-owned practices.  This 
suggests that a relatively high capitation base conflicts with the incentives created by 
 performance-based compensation plans in member-owned firms.  However, capitation 
levels do not explain compensation practices in outside-owned practices. 
Results for both member-owned and outside-owned firms are consistent with our 
hypothesis that performance-based pay receives less weight in settings where clinical 
productivity measures are less informative.  All four measures of reduced information 
content (Staff hospital, <=2 years, 3-5 years, Non-clinical) are negatively and 
significantly (p < 0.01, two-tailed) associated with the use of performance-based pay in 
member-owned firms.  Coefficients on three of the four proxies for reduced information 
content (<=2 years, 3-5 years, Non-clinical) are also negative and significant (p < 0.05, 
two-tailed) in the outside-owned sample. 
Our proxies for monitoring ability exhibit much stronger associations with pay-
performance intensity in member-owned practices than in outside-owned.  As predicted, 
physicians who have more practice colleagues with the same specialty receive less weight 
on performance-based compensation.  This relation is significant at the 5% level in 
member-owned practice, and only marginally insignificant (p < 0.15, two-tailed) in 
outside-owned practices. This evidence suggests that when a larger number of group 
members practice the same specialty, mutual monitoring is more effective, allowing the 
practice to impose less compensation risk on the physician.    Size is positive and 
significant in member-owned practices, consistent with larger groups making greater use 
of performance-based pay to account for the greater difficulty in monitoring.  The 
coefficient on Size is also positive in the outside-owned sample, but is statistically 
insignificant.   
 Contrary to our predictions, member-owned practices use significantly less (p < 
0.01, two-tailed) performance-based pay for physicians in non-surgical specialties 
relative to those in primary care specialties, and do not impose greater pay-performance 
intensity on surgeons.  In addition, specialty group has not significant relation with 
compensation practices in outside-owned groups. 
We also find no support for the prediction that external monitoring capability, as 
measured by Management co. in both samples, Physician executive in member-owned 
practices, and type of owner in outside-owned practices, is negatively associated with 
performance-based pay.  In fact, contrary to our predictions, performance-based pay is 
greater ( p < 0.01, two-tailed) in member-owned practices that use outside management 
companies than those that do not.  This may suggest that management companies 
improve the informativeness of performance-based measures by increasing the reliability, 
timeliness and/or accuracy of performance data.  Management companies may also 
enable physicians to devote more time to enhancing their clinical skills and building the 
practice, which eventually translates into greater clinical productivity.   
Although we made no predictions regarding the impact of ownership on 
compensation design in outside-owned firms, “other” outside ownership is both 
negatively and significantly (p < 0.01, two-tailed, respectively) associated with 
performance-based pay, relative to hospital-owned practices.   Foundations constitute the 
majority of “other” outside-owned entities.  Foundations are formed with the goals of 
performing research in a specific field or caring for a defined population or disease.  
Progress towards such goals is not easily assessed with common productivity-oriented 
clinical measures, potentially explaining the negative relation. 
  
4.2 Intra-firm variation in salary/bonus mix  
In the second set of tests, we regress both a dichotomous and a continuous 
measure of intra-firm variation in compensation methodology on proxies for variation in 
internal monitoring capability and informativeness, and a set of control variables.  The 
unit of analysis in these tests is the practice.  We include all firms in which the 
predominant method of compensation is some combination of salary and/or bonus based 
upon individual performance.10   
The dichotomous measure of intra-firm variation in compensation (denoted Same 
salary/bonus mix) takes the value of 1 if every member in the group receives the same 
combination of salary and bonus (for e.g., all members receive 40% salary and 60% 
bonus), and 0 otherwise.  Results of the logistic regression using same salary/bonus mix 
are contained in Model 1 of Table 4.  The chi-squared statistic is significant at the 1 
percent level or better in both samples, and the Negelkerke r-squareds are 22.7% and 
31.8% for the member-owned and outside-owned sample, respectively.  Consistent with 
our hypotheses, the results suggest that the larger the group and the more diverse the 
training, tasks, experience levels, and responsibilities of its members, the more likely that 
the firm will vary the salary/bonus mix.  The probability that a member-owned firm uses 
the same compensation method with all members is negatively associated (p < 0.01, two-
sided) with firm size, negatively associated (p < 0.01, two-sided) with the relative number 
of different specialties practiced (Specialty diversity), positively associated (p < 0.10, 
two-sided) with the homogeneity of the specialties practiced (% Non-surgical and % 
 Surgical), and positively associated (p < 0.10, two-sided) with the use of team-based 
production (Staff hospital).  Further, the probability that a member-owned firm uses a 
single compensation method is negatively associated (p < 0.05, two-sided) with the 
degree to which group members vary in experience (Variation in experience) and non-
clinical responsibility (Non-clinical variation).  The results for Size and Specialty 
diversity also hold in the outside-owned partition.  Interestingly, in outside-owned firms, 
heterogeneity in the classification of specialties practiced (i.e., primary care, non-
surgical, surgical), variation in experience levels, and variation in non-clinical 
responsibilities do not appear to provide a significant impetus for outside-owned firms to 
vary the salary/bonus mix. 
The last two columns of Table 4 (Model 2) contain OLS regression results for the 
continuous measure of intra-firm variation in compensation, % Physicians with same 
salary/bonus mix.  The model is significant (p < 0.01) in both samples; but, it has greater 
explanatory power with member-owned firms (adjusted r-squared = 13%) than outside-
owned firms (adjusted r-squared = 7%).  The results support our hypotheses and reinforce 
the findings from the logit model.  Consistent with the logit model, the proportion of 
physicians that are compensated in the same manner is negatively and significantly (p< 
0.01, two-tailed) associated with size in outside-owned firms and Specialty diversity in all 
firms.11  As in the logit model, the coefficient on S.taff hospital is positive and significant 
(p<0.10, two-tailed) in the member-owned sample. In contrast to the logit model, the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
10 The predominant method of compensation is the method used with the greatest number of members in a 
group. The predominant method of compensation is used with at least 50% of a group’s members in all but 
one of the 776 firms in our sample. 
11 We also substituted categorical size variables for the continuous measure of size.  Intra-firm variation in 
salary/bonus mix is significantly ( p<0.01, two-tailed) lower in firms with 5-7 members when compared 
with those that have more than 7 members.  In the outside-owned partition, intra-firm variation in 
salary/bonus mix is also significantly ( p<0.01, two-tailed) lower in firms with 8-10 members. 
 overall variation in experience levels is not significantly associated with variation in pay 
practices in either partition.  However, the coefficient on %<=2 years is negative and 
significant (p< 0.01) in both partitions, which suggests that the salary/bonus mix used 
with new physicians differs from that used with more experienced physicians.  Finally, 
consistent with the logit results, the greater the variation in non-clinical activities in 
member-owned firms, the smaller the proportion of physicians that are compensated 
using the same salary/bonus mix (p < 0.01, two-sided). 
 
5. Factors Influencing the Use of Equal Shares 
In our final set of tests, we use a logistic regression model to compare firms that 
compensate members on an equal shares basis (i.e., based upon the group performance) 
to those that compensate members with some combination of salary and/or bonus (i.e., 
based upon individual performance, responsibilities, etc.).  As in the previous set of tests, 
the practice is the unit of analysis.  Since only two of the outside-owned practices use 
equal shares, we limit our anlaysis to member-owned practices.  
A single firm may use equal shares with some members and a salary/bonus 
combination with other members.  T therefore, we use three different specifications to 
test the hypothesis.  In the first specification (Model 1), we compare firms that 
predominantly use equal shares to compensate their physicians (119 firms) to those that 
predominantly use any combination of salary and/or bonus (604 firms).  In the second 
specification (Model 2), we compare firms that use equal shares with all members (42 
firms) to those that use the same combination of salary and/or bonus with all members 
(349 firms).   
 Results are presented in Table 5.  Both models are significant at the one percent 
level, with Negelkerke r-squares of approximately 26%.  Consistent with our predictions, 
the results suggest that firms are significantly more likely to use equal shares when group 
members generally practice in the same or related specialties and have similar levels of 
experience.  The probability that a firm uses equal shares is significantly decreasing in 
the relative number of different specialties practiced (both models, p < 0.01, two-tailed) 
and increasing in the percentage of members that practice in related specialties (model 1 - 
p < 0.01, model 2 - p < 0.05, two-tailed).  Firms whose members vary widely in 
experience are less likely to use equal shares (both models, p < 0.01, two-tailed).  Finally, 
the firms in the first specification (model 1) that have a high percentage of new members 
(2 or fewer years of experience) are also significantly (p < 0.10, two-tailed) less likely to 
use equal shares.   
The third specification (model 3) compares firms that use equal shares with all 
members to firms that use 100% bonus with all members.  Compensation is entirely 
performance-based for all the firms in this specification.  With equal shares, group 
performance determines each member’s compensation, and with 100% bonus-based pay, 
individual performance determines each member’s compensation.  Consistent with our 
prediction, the greater the variation in experience, the less likely that the firm will use 
equal shares (p < 0.05, two-tailed).  However, contrary to our prediction, practices that 
staff hospital departments are less likely to use equal shares (p < 0.10, two-tailed). 
6. Conclusion 
 This paper examines the determinants of compensation in professional service 
firms and provides evidence that such firms support basic agency predictions regarding 
 the information content of performance measures and monitoring accuracy.  Tests of 
informativeness indicate that the proportion of risk-based pay is lower for those with less 
non-clinical responsibility, presumably because standard performance measures provide 
relatively little information regarding effort devoted to non-clinical tasks.  Firms use 
performance-based pay more extensively with physicians that have greater experience; 
however, there are both informativeness-related and reputation-related explanations for 
this result.  Also consistent with informativeness predictions, the proportion of 
performance-based pay is significantly smaller for member-owned practices that staff 
hospital departments and serve a relatively large proportion of capitated patients.  This 
potentially indicates that such physicians have little control over the flow over their work, 
and that standard clinical performance measures do little to indicated whether the 
physician’s actions were in accordance with the organization’s objectives when patients 
are covered under capitation plans.   
Tests of the impact of firm complexity on the use risk-based pay also support 
standard agency predictions regarding the risk-monitoring trade-off.  We find that pay-
performance sensitivity increases significantly with practice diversity, size, and the 
degree of physician specialization, all of which reduce monitoring accuracy.  The impact 
of diversity on pay-performance sensitivity is significantly larger in physician-owned 
practices compared with non-physician-owned practices, while the impact of size on pay-
performance sensitivity is smaller.  Consistent with predictions regarding monitoring 
proficiency, physician-owned practices that appoint one of the co-owners to oversee the 
practice use significantly less performance-based pay.  Contrary to predictions, there is 
 no evidence that management companies improve monitoring proficiency within medical 
practices.   
In general, member-owned firms show more support for agency predictions than 
those owned by outside entities, perhaps indicating that member-owned practices 
potentially conform better to the simple agency model on which the hypotheses are 
based.  This seems reasonable, as non-physician-owned practices are owned by large 
hospital, health system, foundations, and other organizations in which a board, or less 
frequently, stockholders, constitute the “principal”.  Simple agency models, which do not 
directly address such multi-tiered organizations, may be better-suited for the flat 
organizational structure of the typical labor-managed physician-firm.  Furthermore, in 
member-owed firms, the wealth of those actually negotiating contracts, i.e. the member 
themselves, directly depends upon compensation contract design.  Thus, they have a 
significant incentive to choose an efficient contract.  Conversely, in outside-owned 
practices, the administrative employees who negotiate physician contracts on behalf of 
the principal often have little or no explicit monetary interest in the performance of the 
physician practice.   
 Finally, tests of intra-firm variation in pay-performance intensity indicate that the 
larger the firm and the more it varies in non-clinical responsibility and medical 
specialization, the more likely that it will vary its compensation methodology.  
Furthermore, physicians practices that staff hospital departments are less likely to vary 
compensation because tasks performed by individual members do no vary significantly.  
These results further confirm agency predictions in that they demonstrate that variation in 
 compensation is attributable to factors that impact informativeness and monitoring 
accuracy.   
  
Appendix A 
 
Validity Tests for Performance-Based Compensation Variable 
 
 Our performance-based compensation variable is based on categorical responses 
regarding the proportion of a physician’s compensation based upon clinical productivity 
measures.  In this Appendix, we conduct analyses to validate the survey responses.  
Specifically, we estimate pay-for-performance sensitivities using physician-level 
compensation and productivity data.  For each practice with at least ten members (n = 
450 different practices), compensation was regressed on a measure of clinical 
performance (denoted PERFORM), along with measures of a physician’s training, 
experience, and non-clinical responsibility: 
(A-1) INCOMEi =  αi + β1,iPERFORM+ β2,iTRAINING +  
 β3,i EXPERIENCE + β4,iNON-CLINICAL + εi,j,  
 
where PERFORM is a measure of clinical performance (gross charges or RVUs), 
TRAINING is the number of years beyond medical school required for the specialty the 
physician practices, EXPERIENCE is the number of years a physician has practiced in 
his/her specialty area, and NON-CLINICAL is the proportion of a physician’s time 
devoted to non-clinical work. 
 
A.1 Clinical Performance Measures 
Physician practices primarily based performance upon the amount of charges 
generated by a physician, RVUs, or patient encounters, although some practices indicated 
they used two or more of these measures to evaluate performance (Table A-1). 12  Out of 
                                                          
12 Professional gross charges is only an approximation of the actual charge-based measure used.  Groups 
reported using one of the following charge-based measures:  gross charges, adjusted charges, and medical 
revenues.  Gross charges are the full value, at the practices undiscounted rates, of all service provided.  
 450 practices, 242 practices (54%) based performance on charges only, 37 (8%) used 
RVUs only and 11 (2%) used patient encounters only.  Ninety-seven practices (22%) 
used some combination of these measures, while 63 practices (14%) did not use any of 
these standard clinical performance measures to compensation physicians.   
For the 63 practices that did not use clinical performance measures  to evaluate 
physician performance, 27 (43 percent) reported that they did not compensate physicians 
based upon clinical performance (i.e., physician worked on a 100% salary basis), while 
35 percent reported that they based less than half of compensation on clinical 
performance.  Thus, responses of those practices not using a standard clinical 
performance measures are consistent with the compensation methodology reported by 
these practices. 
A.2 Estimation of proportion of pay based upon performance 
 Equation (A-1) was estimated for each of the 334 groups that used a charge-based 
measure.13  Two-hundred and eighty (280) of the 334 groups had sufficient data to 
calculate a coefficient for professional charges, β1, which measures the sensitivity of a 
physician’s income to the amount of professional charges he generates.  The coefficient, 
β1, was significant (p < 0.10, two-tailed) for 90 percent of the groups.  The proportion of 
a physician’s compensation that is based on performance, denoted EST_RISK1, was then 
calculated for each group as:      
                                                                                                                                                                             
Adjusted charges are the total amounts expected to be paid by patients or third party payers.  Medical 
revenue is gross revenue net of refunds, returned checks, contractual discounts and allowances, bad debts 
and write-offs.  Adjusted charges or medical revenues are not reported at the physician-level.  Thus, gross 
charges is used as the performance measure for all firms that used any charge-based measure.  
13 Including only the 281 groups that used just a charge-based measure does not materially affect 
subsequent validity tests. 
 (A-2)        __(β1 x average charges)__ 
(Average group compensation) 
 
The mean estimated proportion of performance-based compensation using (A-2) 
was 74 percent. Although values ranged from –125 percent to 250 percent, the majority 
of observations fell between 0 and 100 percent.  Only 3 percent of firms had negative 
values for the estimated proportion of performance-based pay, and in most of these cases, 
the coefficient on physician charges, β1, was not significant.  The estimated proportion of 
performance-based pay exceeded 100 percent for 22 percent of the groups.  There are two 
potential explanations for this.  First, professional gross charges may not be the actual 
charge figure used in determining physician compensation.  Second, factors besides 
charges, such as administrative responsibility, teaching responsibility, or research 
publications, may also indirectly affect compensation.       
We also estimated performance-based compensation intensity for firms that used 
RVUs to determine physician compensation (EST_RISK2).14  Only 38 of the 90 groups 
had sufficient data to calculate a coefficient for RVUs, β1, which measures the sensitivity 
of a physician’s income to the number of RVUs provided.  The coefficient, β1, was 
significant (p < 0.10 two-tailed) for 81 percent of these groups.  The distribution of 
estimated risk ranged from 0 to 200%, although the majority of observations fell between 
                                                          
14 We did not use patient encounters as a performance variable because encounters include ambulatory, 
hospital, and surgical/anesthesiology services.  The intensity and duration of a patient encounter differs 
substantially across these 3 classifications.  Thus, it is only feasible to measure income-encounter 
sensitivity within groups in which the proportion of each type of encounter is the same across physicians.  
However, few groups had consistent enough encounter patterns to estimate a reasonable number of income-
encounter sensitivities.  Thus, patient encounters were not used to validate the reported compensation 
methodology.  Furthermore, only 69 groups used patient encounters to evaluate physician performance, and 
of these 69 groups, all but 11 also used some other measure.  This may reflect the difficulty in using 
encounters to evaluate a non-homogenous group of physicians. 
 0 and 100%.  The estimated mean (median) proportion of performance-based 
compensation was 78 percent (72 percent).    
A.3 Comparison of estimated proportion of performance-based compensation to 
survey responses 
 
 The estimated proportion of performance-based pay is compared to the actual 
compensation methodology reported using non-parametric correlations and traditional 
tests for differences in means.  Since the proportion of performance-based pay may vary 
within a group, only groups in which at least 80 percent of the members are compensated 
with the same methodology are included in the validity tests.  This reduces the sample 
size to 213 observations in the charge-based sample and 29 in the RVU-based sample.  
Table A-2 illustrates that the average estimated amount of performance-based pay by the 
actual compensation category reported in the survey. As expected, the mean estimated 
proportion of performance-based pay is increasing in the amount of performance-based 
pay reported.  The non-parametric correlations between estimated risk and actual risk are 
0.519 (p<0.01, two-tail) and 0.795 (p<0.01, two-tail) for the charge-based and RVU-
based sample respectively.  Means tests of the between subject effects indicates that both 
estimates of the proportion of performance-based pay vary significantly by the actual risk 
category reported (p<0.01, two-tail).    
 Finally, the validity of the categorical dependent variable is further investigated 
by computing the mean value of total compensation for each category of dependent 
variable.  Agency theory posits that owners must pay agents more to induce the agent to 
accept greater risk.  Accordingly, the mean level of compensation should be greatest 
when compensation is based entirely on performance.  As illustrated in Table A-3, the 
 mean level of compensation does increase as the risk category increases and mean level 
of compensation differs across categories.  
 Overall, our tests indicate that the self-reported proportion of performance-based 
compensation is consistent with the observed compensation payouts.  Thus, we believe 
that the self-reported survey item is a valid measure for use in our empirical analysis. 
   
 
Table A-1 
Measures used in determining physician compensation: 
Use of Patient Encounters * Use of RVUs * Use of Charges 
Cross-tabulation of 450 practices 
 
Use of RVUs 
 No Yes Total
 
No 
 
63 
 
37 
 
100
 
Yes 
 
11 
 
5 16
 
Do not use 
charges 
Use of Patient 
Encounters 
Total 74 42 
 
116
 
No 
 
242 
 
39 281
 
Yes 
 
 43       
  
10    53
 
Use charges Use of Patient 
Encounters
 
Total 285 49 334
 
  
 
Table A-2 
Estimated proportion of performance-based compensation by actual 
category of performance-based compensation from the survey 
 
 
FIRM_%RISK: 
Predominant method 
of compensation for group 
as reported in survey 
question 
EST_RISK1: Mean 
proportion of 
performance-based pay 
estimated using charge-
based measures 
EST_RISK2: Mean 
estimated proportion of 
performance-based pay 
using RVUs 
 
100% Straight Salary  
 
.1973 (n=10) 
 
.4071 (n=5) 
 
50% to 99% Salary  
 
.5206 (n=43) 
 
.4867 (n=8) 
 
50% to 99% Productivity  
 
.7249 (n=65) 
 
.8970 (n=7) 
 
100% Productivity  
 
.9532 (n=5) 
 
1.1306 (n=9) 
 
 
All Categories  
 
.7607 (n=213) 
 
.7719 (n=29) 
 
 
  
Table A-3 
Mean level of compensation by actual category of performance-
based pay reported in survey  (n = 815) 
 
 
Average total compensation  
for FTEs > 0.8. 
 
100% Straight Salary 
 
$194,695 
 
50% to 99% Salary 
 
$210,820 
 
50% to 99% Productivity 
 
$272.334 
 
100% Productivity 
 
$283,159 
 
Total 
 
$243,771 
 
ANOVA F-statistic 
 
20.54 (p < 0.01, two-tail) 
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 Table 1 
Descriptive statistics on medical group pay practices and organizational characteristics 
 
 
Panel A: Physician pay practices1 
 All physicians 
Physicians  
in member-owned groups 
Physicians in  
outside-owned groups 
                      N           %                     N           %                     N             % 
0% bonus         3,242  19%        1,584 14%          1,658 27% 
1-50% bonus         4,121  24%        2,083 19%          2,038 33% 
51-99% bonus         3,573  21%        2,755 25%             818 13% 
100% bonus         5,723  33%        4,049 36%          1,674 27% 
Equal shares           673    4%           666   6%                7   0% 
   TOTAL       17,332   100%       11,137  100%          6,195  100% 
 
 
Panel B: Physician characteristics 2 
 
 All physicians (N=17,332) 
Physicians in  
member-owned groups (N=11,137) 
Physicians in  
outside-owned groups (N=6,195)  
 Mean Median Std Dev. Mean Median Std Dev. Mean4 Median5 Std Dev.
 
Total pay3 $230,910 $185,000 $152,800 $258,409 $210,000 $170,690 $178,983*** $152,209*** $91,096
Same specialty 2.06 1.95 1.15 1.86 1.79 1.01 2.42*** 2.30*** 1.30
Primary care 40.6%  49.1% 29.9%    59.8%***    
Non-surgical 33.4%  47.2% 38.5%    24.3%***    
Surgical 26.0%  43.8% 31.6%    15.9%***    
Experience (years) 13.4 12.0 9.0 13.8 12.0 8.9 12.8*** 11.0*** 9.1
<= 2 years 
experience  8.0%  27.2% 7.4%    9.1%***    
3-to-5 years 
experience 14.0%  34.7% 12.7%    16.3%***    
Non-clinical activity 5.2% 0.0% 14.8% 4.4% 0.0% 14.0% 6.6%*** 0.0%*** 15.9%
 Table 1 (continued) 
 
Panel C: Variation in group pay practices6 
 All groups Member-owned groups Outside-owned groups 
                      N     %                      N      %           N    % 
Combination of salary and/or bonus 776 86.5% 604 83.5% 172 98.9% 
Same salary/bonus mix used for all members 461 51.4% 349 48.3% 112 64.4% 
Same salary/bonus mix used for >= 80%            637 71.0% 494 68.3% 143 82.2% 
    
Equal shares 121 13.5% 119 16.5% 2 1.1% 
Equal shares used for all members 43 4.8% 42 5.8% 1 0.6% 
Equal shares used for >= 80% of members  70 7.8% 68 9.4% 2 1.1% 
TOTAL 897 100% 723 100% 174 100% 
Panel D: Group-level characteristics 7 
 All groups (N=897) Member-owned groups (N=723) Outside-owned groups(N=174) 
 Mean Median Std Dev. Mean Median Std Dev. Mean4 Median5 Std Dev.
# physicians  20.29 9.00 41.44 16.33 9.00 26.42 36.75*** 15.00*** 75.12
Size(log of # physicians) 2.47 2.20 0.84 2.38 2.20 0.74 2.86*** 2.71*** 1.07
Specialty diversity 0.27 0.20 0.16 0.26 0.20 0.16 0.29* 0.25* 0.17
% Primary care 31.6% 0.0% 40.1% 22.2% 0.0% 35.9% 70.5%*** 82.9%*** 32.6%
% Non-surgical 33.3% 7.1% 41.7% 37.1% 9.1% 43.8% 17.4%*** 3.8%*** 26.5%
% Surgical  35.1% 9.1% 43.2% 40.7% 16.7% 45.3% 12.1%*** 0.0%*** 21.1%
% <= 2 years 8.8% 4.7% 11.9% 7.7% 0.0% 10.8% 13.3%*** 10.4%*** 14.9%
% 3-5 years 13.6% 12.5% 12.9% 12.4% 11.1% 11.9% 18.8%*** 15.9%*** 15.7%
Variation in experience 0.78 0.78 0.26 0.77 0.76 0.26 0.84*** 0.83*** 0.24
Non-clinical variation 0.08 0.05 0.10 0.08 0.03 0.10 0.11*** 0.10*** 0.09
Capitation 6.8% 0.0% 13.9% 5.6% 0.0% 12.8% 11.8%*** 5.0%*** 16.9%
Staff hospital 21.2%   20.1%   25.9%*   
Non-profit 13.3%   0.0%   67.2%***   
Management co. 14.2%   12.3%   21.8%   
Physician executive 10.1%   12.0%     
Hospital owns 14.3%     73.6%   
MSO/PPMC owns 0.7%     3.4%   
Other owner 4.5%     23.0%   
 Notes to Table 1 
 
1 Physician pay practices are as follows:  0% bonus – None of the physician’s compensation is derived from a bonus based upon individual performance, i.e., the 
physician’s compensation is derived entirely from salary.  1-50% bonus –  1% to 50% of the physician’s compensation is based upon individual performance, with 
the remainder derived from a fixed salary.   51-99% bonus – 51% to 99% of the physician’s compensation is based upon individual performance, with the remainder 
derived from a fixed salary.  100% bonus – All of the physician’s compensation is based upon individual performance.  Equal shares – Proceeds of participating 
members are divided evenly among those members, irrespective of individual contribution.     
  
2 Physicians compensated on an equal shares basis are excluded from calculations.  Definitions are as follows: Pay – Total annual compensation in dollars.  Same 
specialty – Log of the number of physicians in the practice that have the same specialty as a physician.  Primary care – Indicator variable that equals 1 if physician’s 
specialty is primary care, and 0 otherwise.   Non-surgical – Indicator variable that equals 1 if physician is a non-surgical specialist, and 0 otherwise.  Surgical – 
Indicator variable that equals 1 if physician is a surgical specialist, and 0 otherwise.  <=2 years – Indicator variable that equals 1 if physician has 2 or less years 
experience, and 0 otherwise.  3-5 years – Indicator variable that equals 1 if physician has 3 to 5 years experience, and 0 otherwise.  Non-clinical activity  – 
Percentage of time physician is engaged in non-clinical activities. 
 
3 Not all physicians supplied dollar amounts of compensation.  Thus, full sample for total pay contains only 15,060 physicians vs. 16,659. 
 
4 **, *  indicate that null hypothesis of equal means for member-owned and outside-owned partitions can be rejected at significance level of 1% and 5% respectively. 
 
5 **, * indicate that null hypothesis that member-owned and outside-owned partitions were drawn from same population can be rejected at significance level of 1% 
and 5% respectively. 
 
6 Combination of salary and/or bonus – Predominant method of compensation used by group (i.e., method used with highest percentage of members) is some 
combination of salary and bonus based upon individual performance.  Various combinations of salary and bonus are detailed in Panel A.  Same salary/bonus mix  
used with all members – The same combination of  salary and bonus (for e.g., 30% salary and 70% bonus) is used with every member of the group.  Same 
salary/bonus mix used with >= 80%  – The same combination of salary and bonus is used with at least 80% of the group members.  Equal shares – Proceeds of 
participating members are divided evenly among those members, irrespective of individual contribution.  Equal shares used with all members – Every member of the 
group participates in equal shares distribution.  Equal shares used with >= 80% of members – At least 80% of group members are compensating using equal shares.  
For example, a 10-member group may have only 9 members that participate on an equal shares basis.  In this case, the proceeds of the group are pooled and the net 
proceeds are distributed evenly among those 9 members, while the remaining member receives a salary and/or bonus based upon his/her individual performance.  
 
7 Group-level characteristics exclude groups in which equal shares is predominant method of compensation.  Definitions are as follows:  % physicians with same 
salary/bonus mix  – Percentage of group members that are compensated using the same combination of salary and bonus.  # physicians – number of physicians in the 
practice.  Size – Log of the number of physicians in the practice.  Specialty diversity – Number of different specialties in practice scaled by the number of physicians.  
Larger values indicate a more diverse mix of specialties.   % Primary care – Percentage of group members that practice primary care specialties.  % Non-surgical – 
Percentage of group members that practice non-surgical specialties  % Surgical – Percentage of group members that practice surgical specialties.  % <=2 years – 
Percentage of group members with 2 or fewer years experience.  % 3-5 years – Percentage of group members with 3-to-5 years of experience.  Staff hospital – 
Indicator variable that equals 1 if practice staffs a hospital department, and 0 otherwise.  Capitation- Percentage of a practice’s patients that are covered by capitation 
insurance programs.  Management co. – Indicator variable that equals 1 if practice uses an MSO or PPMC, and 0 otherwise.  Physician executive – Indicator variable 
that equals 1 if practice has appointed a physician-member to manage the group.  Hospital owns, MSO/PPMC owns, and other owner are indicator variables that 
equal 1 if the practice is owned by a hospital/health system, management service organization/physician practice management company, or some other outside 
owner, respectively, and 0 otherwise.  Non-profit – Indicator variable that equals 1 if the entity that owns practice is a not-for-profit entity, and 0 otherwise.   
 Table 2 
Pearson correlations1, 2, 3   
N = 16,659 physicians 
 
 Capitation Size 
Same 
specialty 
Non- 
surgical Surgical 
Staff 
hospital <= 2 years 3-5 years 
Non-
clinical 
Manage-
ment co. 
 
Size 
0.40 1.00         
 (0.00)          
 
Same specialty  0.13 0.44 1.00        
 (0.00) (0.00)         
 
Non-surgical -0.01 0.06 -0.19 1.00       
 (0.29) (0.00) (0.00)        
 
Surgical -0.09 -0.17 -0.28 -0.41 1.00      
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)       
 
Staff hospital 0.23 0.38 0.15 0.19 -0.10 1.00     
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)      
 
<= 2 years -0.01 -0.04 -0.03 -0.05 -0.02 -0.03 1.00    
 (0.49) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00)     
 
3-5 years  -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 -0.12 1.00   
 (0.45) (0.06) (0.13) (0.84) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00)    
 
Non-clinical  -0.01 0.02 0.03 0.02 -0.06 0.05 0.01 -0.01 1.00  
 (0.21) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.12) (0.48)   
 
Management  0.19 0.18 0.03 -0.01 -0.03 0.11 0.01 -0.02 0.01 1.00 
co. (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.15) (0.00) (0.00) (0.14) (0.01) (0.30)  
 0.07 0.00 0.02 0.05 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.07 
 
Physician  (0.00) (0.92) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.51) (0.19) (0.08) (0.23) (0.00) 
executive 0.40 1.00         
  
 
Notes to Table 2 
 
1  Two-tailed significance levels are in ( ) below correlation coefficient. 
 
2 Correlation coefficients do not vary significantly when sample is partitioned into member-owned and outside-owned practices. 
 
3 Variable definitions:  Capitation – Percentage of a practice’s patients that are covered by capitation insurance programs.  Size – Log of the number of 
physicians in the practice.  Same specialty – Log of the number of physicians in the practice that have the same specialty as a physician.  Non-surgical – 
Indicator variable that equals 1 if physician is a non-surgical specialist, and 0 otherwise.  Surgical – Indicator variable that equals 1 if physician is a surgical 
specialist, and 0 otherwise.  Staff hospital – Indicator variable that equals 1 if practice staffs a hospital department, and 0 otherwise.  <=2 years-Indicator 
variable that equals 1 if physician has 2 or less years of experience, and 0 otherwise.  3-5 years – Indicator variable that equals 1 if physician has 3 to 5 years 
of experience, and 0 otherwise.  Non-clinical – Percentage of time physician is engaged in non-clinical activities.  Management co. – Practice engages the 
services of a MSO or PPMC.  Physician executive – Practice has appointed a physician-member to manage the group.   
 
  
Table 3 
Performance-based compensation as a percentage of total individual pay1 
 
 
Member-owned practices Outside-owned practices 
 
Variable2 Predicted sign Coefficient (t-stat) Coefficient (t-stat) 
Constant  93.12 *** 71.98 *** 
  (13.59)  (6.00)  
Goal congruence    
Capitation - -45.43 *** -3.94  
  (-6.65)  (-0.19)  
Informativeness     
Staff hospital - -15.42 *** -9.00  
  (-4.19)  (-1.20)  
<= 2 years - -27.56 *** -15.02 *** 
  (-11.77)  (-4.01)  
3-5 years - -9.00 *** -5.00 *** 
  (-7.19)  (-2.61)  
Non-clinical - -14.01 *** -12.41 ** 
  (-3.11)  (-2.42)  
Monitoring ability     
Size +/- 4.37 *** 2.21  
  (2.93)  (0.98)  
Same specialty - -3.02 ** -3.19  
  (-2.35)  (-1.58)  
Non-surgical + -12.60 *** -6.61  
  (-4.63)  (-1.57)  
Surgical + 0.51  -3.74  
  (0.21)  (-1.15)  
Management co. - 8.60 ** -5.76  
  (2.16)  (-0.72)  
Physician executive - 1.20    
  (0.28)    
MSO/PPMC owns    12.38  
    (1.31)  
Other owner    -29.94 *** 
    (-3.36)  
  
Table 3, continued 
 
Control variables4 Member-owned practices Outside-owned practices 
Non-profit   2.34  
   (0.39)  
Suburb -11.68 *** -7.04  
 (-3.10)  (-0.94)  
Rural  -14.26 *** 15.07 * 
 (-3.70)  (1.82)  
Northeast -29.05 *** -25.66 ** 
 (-2.84)  (-2.44)  
North Atlantic -36.64 *** -52.81 *** 
 (-5.45)  (-4.48)  
Mid Atlantic -20.97 *** -39.93  
 (-2.83)  (-3.95)  
Rocky mountain -11.52 ** -18.03 * 
 (-2.25)  (-1.69)  
Northwest 6.51  -23.79 * 
 (1.59)  (-1.84)  
Southwest -6.99 * -20.91 ** 
 (-1.68)  (-2.36)  
Eastern Midwest -10.19  -30.89 *** 
 (-2.48)  (-3.80)  
Lower Midwest -9.82 * -12.97  
 (-1.90)  (-0.87)  
Southern CA 0.38    
 (0.05)    
Northern CA -4.31  18.86 ** 
 (-0.26)  (2.38)  
     
Number of physicians       10,471          6,188   
Number of practices 681  173  
F-statistic 25.1 *** 34.57 *** 
R-squared4 30.50%  46.31%  
  
1 Dependent variable is the percentage of a physician’s total pay that is based upon individual performance, i.e., bonus as 
percentage of total compensation.  The bonus portion can constitute 0%, 25%, 75%, or 100% of compensation. 
 
2 Variable definitions: Capitation – Percentage of a practice’s patients that are covered by capitation insurance programs.  
Size – Log of the number of physicians in the practice.  Same specialty – Log of the number of other physicians in the 
practice that have the same specialty as a physician.  Non-surgical – Indicator variable that equals 1 if physician is a non-
surgical specialist, and 0 otherwise.  Surgical – Indicator variable that equals 1 if physician is a surgical specialist, and 0 
otherwise.  Staff hospital – Indicator variable that equals 1 if practice staffs a hospital department, and 0 otherwise.  <=2 
years –Indicator variable that equals 1 if physician has 2 or less years experience, and 0 otherwise.  3-5 years – Indicator 
variable that equals 1 if physician has 3 to 5 years experience, and 0 otherwise.  Non-clinical – Percentage of time 
physician is engaged in non-clinical activities.  Physician executive – Practice has appointed a physician member to 
manage the group.  Management co. – Practice engages the services of a MSO or PPMC.  Hospital owns, MSO/PPMC 
owns, and other owner are indicator variables that equal 1 if the practice is owned by a hospital/health system, 
management service organization/physician practice management company, or some other outside owner, respectively, 
and 0 otherwise.  Non-profit – Indicator variable that equals 1 if the entity that owns practice is a not-for-profit entity, and 
0 otherwise.   
 
3 Indicator variables for metropolitan area and region. Missing area variable is urban. Missing region is Upper Midwest.  
No outside-owned practices in the sample are located in Southern California. 
 
4 If control variables are removed from models, values for r-square drop to 22.5% for member-owned firms and 28.3% 
for outside-owned firms. 
 
*, **, and ***  indicate two-tailed significance levels for test statistics of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
  
Table 4  
Intra-firm variation in the use of salary and bonus1 
 
  
Model 1 (Logit model) 
Same salary/bonus mix used  
for all physicians in practice 2 
Model 2 (OLS model)  
% of  physicians in practice  
with same salary/bonus mix 3 
  Member-owned Outside-owned Member-owned Outside-owned 
Variable4 Predicted sign Coefficient (Wald statistic) Coefficient (t-statistic) 
Constant         3.18*** 3.08*** 1.00*** 1.06*** 
  (22.27) (3.92) (34.34) (17.39) 
Goal congruence     
Capitation 0.53(0.45)
 
0.42
(0.12)
 
0.003
(0.06) 
0.11
(1.77)
 
* 
Informativeness      
Staff hospital + 0.44* -0.14 0.026* -0.02 
  (2.84) (-0.08) (1.84) (-0.80) 
% <= 2 years - -1.15 -1.99 -0.215*** -0.17*** 
  (-0.73) (-1.83) (-2.84) (-2.27) 
% 3-5 years - 0.21 0.14 -0.086* 0.02 
  (0.06) (0.01) (-1.88) (0.28) 
Variation in  - -1.22** 0.18 -0.021 0.01 
   experience  (-4.47) (0.04) (-0.67) (0.30) 
Non-clinical variation - -3.87*** -1.86 -0.319*** -0.09 
  (-16.69) (-0.66) (-6.25) (-0.81) 
Monitoring ability     
Size5 +/- -0.61
 
*** -0.78*** -0.008
 
-0.04*** 
  (-20.97) (-10.65) (-1.17) (-3.50) 
Specialty diversity - -1.73*** -4.16*** -0.077*** -0.19*** 
  (-9.02) (-8.09) (-2.46) (-2.67) 
% Non-surgical + 0.65* 0.78 0.019 0.00 
  (3.58) (0.86) (1.19) (0.05) 
% Surgical + 0.69** -0.32 0.026 0.05 
  (5.28) (-0.10) (1.47) (1.22) 
Management co.                           -0.37  0.37 -0.010  0.02 
 (-1.64)  (0.46) (-0.63)  (0.76) 
Physician executive 0.09   -0.015   
 (0.10)   (-0.94)   
MSO/PPMC owns  -0.43  0.87 
  (-0.13)  (0.16) 
Other owner   0.50  0.53 
   (1.00)  (0.63) 
      
Number of practices7 604  172 604  172 
Negelkerke or Adj. R-square 22.7%  31.8% 13.47%  6.91% 
Chi square or F statistic 111.7 *** 45.1*** 8.83 *** 1.91*** 
 Notes to Table 4 
 
1  The analyses include only firms whose predominant method of compensation is a combination of salary and bonus.  
Firms that predominantly use equal shares (119 member-owned and 2 outside-owned firms) are excluded from this 
analysis.  Including these firms reduces the significance of % surgical and % staff hospital, but does not materially 
impact our conclusions.   
 
2  Logistic regression.  Dependent variable equals 1 (349 firms) if every group member receives the same combination of 
salary and/or bonus and 0 otherwise (255 firms).  We also repeated the analysis after recoding the dependent variable to 
equal 1 if at least 80% of a groups members receive the same combination of salary and/or bonus, and 0 otherwise.  This 
reduced the significance of the % non-surgical, % surgical and % staff hospital variables, but did not materially affect 
our conclusions.  
 
3  Ordinary least squares regression.  Dependent variable is the percentage of group members that receive the same 
combination of salary and/or bonus.  Higher values indicate greater intra-group uniformity in compensation.  
 
4 Independent variables: Specialty concentration – Number of different specialties in group scaled by the number of 
group members (smaller values indicate greater diversity in specialties). % Non-surgical – % of group members in non-
surgical specialties.  % Surgical – % of group members in a surgical specialties.   Staff hospital –  Indicator variable that 
equals 1 if practice staffs a hospital department, and 0 otherwise.   % <=2 years – % of group members with less than 2 
years experience.  % 3-5  years – % of group members with 3 to 5 years of experience. Variation in experience – 
standard deviation of group members’ experience.  Non-clinical variation – Standard deviation of the percentage of time 
group members are engaged in non-clinical activities. Capitation – Percentage of a practice’s patients that are covered 
by capitation insurance programs.  Size – Log of the number of physicians in the practice.  Management co.–Practice has 
engaged the services of a MSO or PPMC.  Physician executive – Practice has appointed a physician-member to manage 
the group.  Hospital owns, MSO/PPMC owns, and other owner are indicator variables that equal 1 if the practice is 
owned by a hospital/health system, management service organization/physician practice management company, or some 
other outside owner that is not a hospital/health system or MSO/PPMC, respectively, and 0 otherwise.  Non-profit – 
Indicator variable that equals 1 if the entity that owns practice organizes as a not-for-profit, and 0 otherwise.   
 
5 We also used indicator variables to compare intra-firm variation in compensation for firms with 5-7 members and 8-10 
members to firms with more than 10 members.  Intra-firm variation in compensation is significantly lower ( p<0.01, 
two-tailed) firms with 5-7 members and 8-10 members when compare to firms with more than 10 members.  This is 
consistent with the result for size, in which intra-firm variation in compensation methodology is increasing in firm size. 
 
6 Controls for metropolitan area and geographic region were included in the logistic regression, but are not shown in the 
table.  Controls for metropolitan area and geographic region were not included in the OLS regression because did not 
statistically significantly improve the models fit. 
 
6 The number of firms (604 + 172 = 776) does not agree with the number of firms in the physician-level analysis (Table 
3: 682 + 173 = 855) because 244 physicians that receive a salary/bonus mix, and hence are included in the physician-
level analysis, work in 125 firms that predominantly use equal shares, and thus are excluded from this analysis. 
 
7 Change in R-square and F-statistic if control variables for metropolitan location and geographical region (suburban, 
rural, Northeast, etc.) are included in the OLS model.   
 
 *, **, and ***  indicate two-tailed significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.  “n.s.” not significant at a level 
of 10% or better. 
 
 
 
 Table 5 
Use of team-based (equal shares) vs. individual-based (salary/bonus) compensation 
in member-owned firms (logit model)1, 2 
  
Model 1 
Predominantly ES vs 
Predominantly  S/B 
Model 2 
100% ES vs. 
100% same S/B mix 
Model 3 
100% ES vs. 
100% All Bonus 
Variable3 Predicted Coeff (Wald statistic) Coeff (Wald statistic) Coeff (Wald statistic)
 
Constant  -1.41 0.90 2.81
  (1.60) (0.27) (1.49)
Goal congruence     
Capitation 
 -0.86 -1.80 -4.29  
  (0.47) (0.50) (1.39)  
Informativeness     
Staff hospital + -0.11 -0.58 -1.32 * 
  (0.16) (1.32) (3.44)  
% <= 2 years - 2.19* 0.81 -0.58  
  (2.86) (0.15) (0.03)  
% 3-5 years - -0.04 1.12 0.89  
  (0.00) (0.43) (0.13)  
Variation in experience - -1.06*** -3.36*** -3.42 ** 
  (12.05) (5.64) (5.64)  
Non-clinical variation - -0.86 -1.80 -4.29  
  (0.47) (0.50) (1.39)  
Monitoring ability     
Size4 - -0.32 -0.27 0.01  
  (2.70) (0.56) (0.00)  
Specialty diversity - -4.16*** -5.69*** -3.84  
  (15.13) (6.98) (1.39)  
% Non-surgical + 2.72*** 1.81** 1.43  
  (22.82) (4.46) (1.22)  
% Surgical + 1.47*** 0.76 1.42  
  (6.84) (0.84) (1.41)  
Management Co.  1.28 2.66 3.72  
  (1.16) (2.29) (1.83)  
Physician executive  0.39 0.23 0.88  
  (1.28) (0.13) (0.90)  
      
Number of practices  723 391 179
Negelkerke R-square  26.06% 26.30% 38.50%  
Chi-Squared  120.95 54.38 32.52
  
 
 
Notes to Table 5 
 
1 Model 1 includes all firms.  Dependent variable equals 1 if predominant method of compensation (i.e., form used 
most often) is equal shares (119 firms), and 0 if predominant method of compensation is some combination of salary 
and/or bonus (604 firms).  In all but one case, predominant method of compensation is used with at least 50% of the 
group members. 
Model 2 includes only firms that compensate all members using equal shares and those that use the same salary/bonus 
combination with all members.  The dependent variable is equals 1 if 100% of the group members are compensated 
using equal shares (42 firms), and 0 if 100% of group members are compensated using the same mix of salary and 
bonus (349 firms).  Firms that vary compensation by member are excluded from this analysis.   
Model 3 includes only firms that compensate all members using equal shares and those that compensate all members 
with 100% bonus.  The dependent variable equals 1 if 100% of the group members are compensated using equal 
shares (42 firms), and 0 if 100% of  group members’ compensation is entirely based upon individual performance or 
bonus (54 firms).  Firms that vary compensation member and firms that use a method other than equal shares or 100% 
performance-based bonus are excluded. 
 
2 Of the 121 practices that use equal shares, only 2 of these practices are outside-owned.  Hence, corresponding model 
for outside-owned practices is not significant and is not shown. 
 
3 Independent variables: Size – Log of the number of physicians in the practice.  Specialty concentration – Number of 
different specialties in group scaled by the number of group members (smaller numbers indicate greater diversity in 
specialties among group numbers). % Non-surgical – % of group members in a non-surgical specialty.  % Surgical – 
% of group members in a surgical specialty.  Staff hospital – Indicator variable that equals 1 if practice staffs a 
hospital department, and 0 otherwise.  Variation in experience – standard deviation of group members experience.  % 
<=2 years – % of group members with less than 2 years experience.  % 3-5 years – % of group members with 3 to 5 
years of experience. Non-clinical variation – Standard deviation of the percentage of time group members are engaged 
in non-clinical activities. Capitation – Percentage of a practice’s patients that are covered by capitation insurance 
programs.  Physician executive – Practice has appointed a physician-member to manage the group.  Management co. –
Practice has engaged the services of a MSO or PPMC.   
 
4 We also used indicator variables to compare intra-firm variation in compensation for firms with 5-7 members and 
those with 8-10 members to firms with more than 10 members.  Consistent with the above result for size, neither 
indicator variable was significant. 
 
5 Control variables for metropolitan location and geographical region (suburban, rural, Northeast, etc.) are included in 
the model, but are not shown.  Negelkerke R-square and chi-square statistic without metropolitan and regional 
controls are 20.9% and 95.56, 21.3% and 43.23, and 24.4% and 19.26 for models 1, 2 and 3, respectively.   
 
 *, **, and ***  indicate two-tailed significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
 
